The Loss of the Battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland

Image source: National Museum of the Royal Navy

The Battle of Jutland is widely considered to be both one of the most important naval battles of World War I, and one of the most important naval battles in British history. This battle, which occurred from 31 May to 1 June 1916, pitted the German High Seas Fleet against the Grand Fleet of the United Kingdom. To break the ongoing blockade of Germany, Admiral Scheer decided it was necessary to lure out and destroy a portion of the numerically superior Grand Fleet. At that point, he could have successfully engaged the remaining British ships. Unfortunately for Germany, Scheer’s plan was entirely unsuccessful. After being informed that the German navy was in the process of conducting an operation, a large majority of the Grand Fleet, under the command of Admiral Jellicoe, sailed to engage and destroy the German navy. First contact between the two fleets occurred when the British Battlecruiser Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Beatty, encountered and engaged the German First Scouting Group.¹

Soon after making contact, the British and German battlecruisers began to exchange fire. As the fight continued, three British battlecruisers were lost due to catastrophic internal explosions. The German First Scouting Group, under the command of Admiral Hipper, finished the initial engagement without losing a single battlecruiser. Considering that the British forces consisted of four battleships and six battlecruisers, and that Hipper only had five battlecruisers under his command, this outcome is extremely surprising. Perhaps even more surprising is that the British Battlecruiser Fleet also failed to inflict major damage on their adversaries before the end of the engagement.² Since 1916, many historians have studied the events of the battle, and the loss of these ships, with the intent of determining the cause of the internal explosions. While one theory has gathered significant support in recent years, further study of alternative theories may provide a more complete understanding of the loss of the battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland.

Before this event can be analyzed, the firsthand accounts must be studied. Unfortunately, many of those who could have provided firsthand accounts perished in the explosions that sunk the ships. However, there were some survivors who could tell their tale. Petty Officer E. Francis of “X” Turret on the HMS Queen Mary recounts the following:

“Then came the big explosion, which shook us a bit…The after 4-inch battery was smashed right out of all recognition, and then I noticed the ship had an awful list to port…P.O Stares was the last I saw coming up from the working chamber, and I asked whether he had passed the order [to evacuate] to the magazine and shell room, and he told me it was no use, as the water was right up the truck leading from the shell room, so the bottom of the ship must have been out of her.”³

Mr. Francis’ account notes that the location of shell penetration appeared to be near one of the ships 4-inch guns. Based on the layout of Lion class battlecruisers, and the location of their 4-inch guns, this account seems to indicate that the shells responsible for the destruction of the Queen Mary penetrated the ship’s armor and potentially entered a magazine.⁴

The Indefatigable was also destroyed in the early stages of the battle. The Navigating Officer of the New Zeeland directly observed the sinking of the Indefatigable. He states that the Indefatigable was “…hit by two shells, one on the foc’sle and one on the fore turret.”⁵ He notes that both shells appeared to explode on impact, but, after a pause of about thirty seconds, the ship “…completely blew up, commencing apparently from forward.”⁶ Interestingly, the officer also notes that the main explosion was followed by clouds of dense and dark smoke, a distinctive byproduct of burning cordite shell propellant.⁷ Since this propellant was stored in the magazine, the description provided by this officer seems to indicate that the Indefagitable suffered from a magazine detonation.

It should be noted that the HMS Lion, Beatty’s flagship, almost suffered the same fate. The Gunnery Officer of the Lion records the following:

“…an enemy shell of large caliber…hit the turret and detonated inside the gun house, putting the turret out of action and causing, with the cordite fire that resulted from it, about sixty deaths…The Officer of the Turret, though himself severely wounded, realized that his turret was out of action and on fire, and also that the fire might reach the magazine. He accordingly passed his orders by the direct voice-pipe down to the handling-room below, to close the magazine doors and open the magazine flood valves. This order was promptly carried out, and did in fact prevent the flash from the cordite charges reaching the magazines, and so the ship from being blown up.”⁸

This account seems to confirm the belief that cordite fires caused by the penetration of German shells resulted in the internal explosions that sunk the other battlecruisers. Presumably, the magazine doors of the lost ships were not closed, nor were their magazines flooded in a timely manner. It is likely that accounts such as these have led historians, such as Admiral Reginald Bacon, to look to the flash doors on ships for an explanation of the losses.

In his book, The Jutland Scandal, Bacon explains that shells and shell propellant are exposed as they wait to be loaded and fired, and that flash fires can occur if the turret is struck. Flash doors are put in place to prevent these fires from spreading down and into the magazine. Bacon asserts, quite confidently, that the flash doors in the ships must have been inadequate or unable to cope with the explosive force and heat produced when the cordite in the turret ignited.⁹

To support this theory, Bacon claims that the navy can never be certain of the quality of individual ship components. Poor materials, random errors in production, or pure chance may result in a component that does not meet quality standards. According to Bacon, random quality checks and screenings will inevitably result in some unsatisfactory materials slipping past the inspectors. Considering this, Bacon concludes that inadequate, malfunctioning, or improperly used flash doors are solely responsible for the loss of the Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Invincible. ¹⁰ A similar belief was held by the Gunnery Committee assembled by Beatty to examine the lessons that could be learned from the battle. Their report states the following:

“With existing designs of turrets it is impossible to safeguard the Handling Room from the flash of a shell burst, in the gun-house or working chamber. Magazines must therefore be able to withstand flame under pressure…One of the venting plates in the Lionadmitted a tongue of flame into the Magazine; this plate was of the old type, and had not be modified in accordance with A.W.O. 1331 and G.F.G.O. No 459–15.5.16.”¹¹

Beatty was, originally, a supporter of this theory. He seems to have held this belief even before the report from the Gunnery Committee was released. In a letter to the Admiralty, sent only two days after the battle, Beatty states, “Undoubtedly the loss of Invincible was due to magazine doors being left open…I have given orders to battle-cruisers that magazine doors are to be kept closed on one clip….”¹² While Bacon assumes that the flash doors were inadequate, Beatty seems to have concluded that they simply were not being used. This theory is compatible and complementary to the theory of historian Nicholas Lambert.

In “‘Our Bloody Ships’ or ‘Our Bloody System’? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916,” Nicholas Lambert attempts to analyze the British Admiralty’s conclusions regarding the cause of the loss of the battlecruisers at the Battle of Jutland. Using the conclusions of a small investigation conducted shortly after the battle as his primary evidence, Lambert asserts that British battlecruisers were overstocked with cordite. More importantly, he asserts that the cordite they carried was left exposed and insecurely stored during battle. To strengthen this argument, Lambert explains that the prevailing naval doctrine of the era put an emphasis on rapid fire. From Beatty’s letters, and the firing exercises of his ships, Lambert determined that Beatty, his subordinates, and his crew whole-heartedly embraced this doctrine. Lambert concludes that this led them to forego the proper storage of cordite so that the guns could be loaded and fired more rapidly.¹³

Indeed, the premise that naval doctrine of era put an emphasis on rapid fire is likely correct. This school of thought can be seen across several works of the era, notably those of Baudry and Fiske.¹⁴ Additionally, the Germans remarked on the extremely rapid fire of several of the British ships, including the Queen Mary.¹⁵ Notably, twenty days after the battle, Vice-Admiral Sturdee wrote a memorandum titled “Lessons from Battle of 31 May 1916.” In it, he stated, “It seems to be of great importance that we should open fire before the enemy, and establish hitting before he does. Provided that increased rate of fire gives a reasonable chance of increased rate of hitting, the rate of fire should be increased to the furthest possible limit.”¹⁶

Clearly, rapid fire was a vital part of British naval strategy, even after the Battle of Jutland. Therefore, there is little doubt that shortcuts would have been taken to ensure that cordite was supplied to the turrets as fast as possible. If the crews were focused on rapid loading and disregarded safety to achieve this, it would make sense that all the doors from the turret to the magazine would be left open. Lambert’s theory not only confirms and corroborates Bacon’s theory, but it also provides a more nuanced explanation of the loss of the battlecruisers. However, Admiral Jellicoe disagrees with both of these historians.

Jellicoe opened the twelfth chapter of his book, The Grand Fleet, 1914–1916; its Creation, Development and Work, by discussing the loss of the battlecruisers. He wrote, “…one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately protected by armour as compared with the German vessels of the battle cruiser type. It was considered undesirable to draw attention to this publicly while the war was in progress.”¹⁷

This statement makes it clear that Jellicoe believes armor, or lack-thereof, is responsible for the loss of the battlecruisers. This “thin armor” narrative was also recorded in Julian Corbett’s influential book series, History of the Great War: Naval Operations.¹⁸ Furthermore, Jellicoe acknowledges that, during the war, actions may have been taken to suppress information regarding the loss of the battlecruisers. However, it is possible that Jellicoe made that statement to explain away the fact that no major wartime investigation concluded that a lack of armor was responsible for the losses.

Jellicoe states, “The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than their British contemporaries…The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions, including deck protection….”¹⁹ These statements may have some truth to them. Historian John Roberts notes that the British seemed to favor protection of their ship’s engines and machinery rather than their turrets and barbettes.²⁰ A review of the armor schematics of German and British battlecruisers leads to the same conclusion.

Take the German battlecruiser Seydlitz and the British battlecruiser Lion as examples of the differences in armor thickness between British and German ships. Seydlitz, which had one of its turret penetrated at the Battle of Dogger Bank, sported 250mm of turret armor. The Lion, which had a turret penetrated at Jutland, sported only 229mm of turret armor. The armor on the Derfflinger, a ship that fought for the Germans at Jutland, accounted for approximately 37.0% of its displacement. The Lion’s armor, however, only accounted for 23.0% of its displacement.²¹ Furthermore, for purposes of comparison, it should be noted that the penetration of the Lion occurred at a greater distance than the penetration of the Seydliz.²²

This lack of armor on British turrets may have left them more vulnerable to penetration and the flash fires that would likely follow. Some historians assert that British ships were intentionally given less armor than their German counterparts. Those historians contend that, if fewer resources are put into individual ships, more ships can be produced. Additionally, if fewer resources and time are put into defense, more resources are left available to devote to offense. Some historians even go so far as to suggest that the tradeoffs of quantity over quality and of firepower over armor were essential to the British victory at Jutland.²³

It should also be noted that Henry Mayo, a United States admiral, agreed with Jellicoe’s conclusion that the thin armor on the battlecruiser was responsible for the losses. In a hearing of the United States House Committee on Naval Affairs, President Woodrow Wilson asked Mayo about the lessons the British learned at the Battle of Jutland. Admiral Mayo responded by stating that they learned about the necessity of better armor protection. As the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet for approximately two and a half years at the time of this statement, Mayo was well suited to discuss this topic.²⁴ Considering that he fulfilled that role during the later stages of WWI, it is highly likely that he came to this conclusion after speaking with several senior British naval officials, perhaps including Jellicoe himself. Since this statement was taken during a congressional hearing, which included the president and several important congressmen, Admiral Mayo likely believed everything that he said. His support of Jellicoe’s “armor theory” lends it more credence.

Jellicoe also sought to explain the inability of the British to inflict much damage on the Germans during the battlecruiser engagement. In his book, he states the following:

“The Germans possessed a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly efficient armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place inside the armour of British ships instead of outside, or whilst passing through the armour, which was the case with British shells of that date fired against the thick German armour.”²⁵

This belief was also held by Admiral Mayo, and is likely true. Documents show that lyddite was likely the explosive used in the British shells fired at the Battle of Jutland.²⁶ Lyddite, unlike some other explosive compounds, was known to explode on impact, as Jellicoe describes.²⁷ The problems and shortcomings of lyddite were well known, but due to shortages of a more effective explosive, such as trinitrotoluene, lyddite continued to be used.²⁸

While the use of lyddite instead of other explosives is a valid explanation for the inability of the British to inflict damage, there are other explanations for the German’s resistance to internal explosions. Director of Naval Construction Eustace H.W.T. d’Eyncourt noted several important facts about German ships in a memorandum:

“‘Blucher’ was repeatedly hit by heavy shell, some of which, entering through the unprotected bottom must have penetrated to, or burst in or near her magazines. A turret in ‘Seydlitz’ was seen to be surrounded by sheets of flame rising as high as her masthead and obviously due to fire in the magazine. ‘Koln’ was under the concentrated fire of five Battle Cruisers at about 6000 yards for some minutes, but there was no trace of an explosion. A light cruiser reduced to sinking condition passed the whole length of the battle line under heavy fire and burning furiously, but yet did not blow up.”²⁹

Clearly, the German ships mentioned by d’Eyncourt (Blucher, Seydlitz and Koln) had their amour penetrated, yet did not explode like the British battlecruisers. These facts seem to disprove Jellicoe’s theory that the superior armor of the German battlecruiser protected them from internal explosions. While it is true that the British battlecruisers carried less armor than their German counterparts, other factors definitely contributed to the German resilience.

The simplest explanation for the lack of damage inflicted by the British battlecruisers is simply that they were unable to hit their targets. It is possible that the previously discussed emphasis on rapid fire came at the cost of accuracy, as Lambert suggests.³⁰ In The Jutland Scandal, Admiral J.E.T. Harper asserts that poor visibility and weather disproportionally hampered British gunnery. He explains that poor weather negated the British range advantage and allowed the Germans to more easily disengage from battle by escaping into the mist. Harper also notes that, due to direction of movement and location of the weather, British ships were silhouetted against a clear horizon, while the German ships were obscured.³¹ Alternatively, some reports suggest that, both in battle and in practice, British gunners faced serious interference from the smoke of their own weapons. As mentioned previously, the shell propellant used by the British produced clouds of particularly dark and dense smoke when ignited.³²

It should also be noted that, during the Battle of Dogger Bank, which occurred before the Battle of Jutland, the SMSSeydlitz was struck by shells from the HMS Lion. The shell propellant in the turret was ignited, creating an explosion and starting a fire. This fire soon began to spread toward the magazines, which might have resulted in a detonation and the complete loss of the ship. Fortunately for the Germans, some officers were able to find their way through the smoke and flames to turn the valve that would flood the magazines. This action most likely saved the ship from destruction.³³ From this incident, the Germans likely learned a lesson in regards to flash protections and the proper handling of shell propellant. These stricter precautionary measures likely played a role in the German’s resistance to flash fires and magazine detonations. Furthermore, this piece of evidence lends further credence to both Bacon’s “magazine door” theory and Lambert’s “cordite handling” theory. However, a closer look at cordite itself is now necessary to further validate or refute Bacon and Lambert’s theories.

Cordite was a shell propellant used by the British throughout WWI. Composed of a volatile mixture of cellulose nitrate and nitroglycerin, cordite created a controlled explosion that propelled a projectile to its target. Often, plasticizers and stabilizers were added to change certain chemical and physical properties of the explosive.³⁴ Some people believe that the chemical properties of cordite may have facilitated the creation of particularly large flash fires when British turrets were struck.³⁵ Unfortunately, an analysis of the truth of these claims is complicated by the fact that cordite existed in various chemical forms over time. However, it is likely that cordite M.D. was the form most commonly used during World War I. Unfortunately for the British, there is evidence that cordite might have been slightly too good at exploding. Tests conducted in 1910 suggested that cordite would slowly decompose at temperatures “not greatly above the normal.”³⁶ Whether “normal” was referring to 25 degrees Celsius (room temperature) or zero degrees Celsius is unclear, as thermodynamic and chemical properties can be measured and compiled at both temperatures. Regardless, it is likely that either temperature could be exceeded in the bowels of a ship. Chemicals produced in the decomposition of cordite can act as catalysts for the explosive reaction, making the propellant more powerful and more unstable.

Additionally, tests conducted in 1945 by the Unites States Navy found that cordite was relatively unstable regardless of its state of decay. Those tests found that cordite would ignite 530mm from a flash source, whereas standard American propellants would only ignite when moved 410mm closer to the same flash source.³⁷ Since cordite ignites so easily, it is logical to concluded that a British ship would have more flash fires than its German counterpart, even if all other factors are ignored. Therefore, d’Enycourt was entirely correct when he speculated that, “…the nature of the ammunition we use is not sufficiently stable to ensure safety.”³⁸

In summary, an emphasis on rapid fire in the British navy led to the disregard of safety precautions because crews wanted to maximize the speed at which cordite and ammunition could be brought to the guns. Magazine doors being left open made the ships particularly susceptible to flash fires spreading down to, and detonating, the magazine. While the lack of heavy armor on the British battlecruisers was likely not the cause of the shell penetrations that destroyed those ships, it certainly may have exacerbated the situation. Additionally, the cordite used by the British was already especially susceptible to ignition. This is due to cordite’s natural properties and the potential chemical decay which may have occurred as the propellant sat in storage. This, combined with poor handling practices, made the British particularly susceptible to internal explosions. The Germans were shielded from the dangers of flashfire because the handling and storage procedures for their shell propellant were much stricter. This strict stance was likely adopted after the Battle of Dogger Bank, when the Germans almost lost a ship to some of the same factors that caused the loss of the battlecruisers at Jutland.

While it is easy to attribute the loss of the battlecruisers to a single factor, it is highly unlikely that the losses are simple enough to be explained in this manner. Instead, it is highly likely that a variety of complex, compounding factors caused the British losses. However, through the study of the various theories proposed over the last century, one can gain a more complete understand of this event. Unfortunately, due to the lack of conclusive physical evidence and the amount of time passed since the Battle of Jutland occurred, it is highly unlikely that the exact causes of the loss of the battlecruisers will ever be determined.

---

Sources